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ABSTRACT
This paper adopts a normative approach to catastrophe insurance. It addresses the
question of how innovations in the design of insurance contracts could help resolve
the capacity gap in the provision of insurance against natural catastrophes. It extends
previous research with the same approach first by considering the case of
"uncorrelated catastrophes", and second by combining the influence of catastrophes
on claims amounts (severity risk) and on the probability of loss (frequency risk). We
show that the menu of contracts proposed in previous research, where only one type
of catastrophe is considered, is dominated by the menu of contracts proposed in this
paper, taking into account the absence of correlation between catastrophes of different
kinds.Optimal catastrophe insurance
with multiple catastrophes
Henri Loubergé, University of Geneva
Harris Schlesinger, University of Alabama
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
This paper adopts a normative approach. It addresses the question of how innovations
in the design of insurance contracts could help resolve the capacity gap in the
provision of insurance against natural catastrophes. It extends previous research with
the same approach (Doherty and Schlesinger, 1998; Schlesinger, 1998) by considering
the case of "uncorrelated catastrophes".
Catastrophic losses challenge the role of insurance as a redistribution mechanism. The
problem arises because the risk of natural catastrophes is not widely diversifiable in
an insurance context where insurers supply insurance coverage in well-defined
business lines. Natural catastrophes tend to occur in selected areas of the globe:
seismic regions and ocean coasts. Moreover, only a subset of these regions expresses
a demand for insurance coverage. Thus reinsurers are not able to disseminate the risk
easily across the world, and cross-subsidization among different lines of business is
not feasible in a competitive environment.
Two types of  solutions to the insurance capacity gap have been proposed and put into
practice. Mandatory public provision of insurance is a first alternative. It relies on the
financial and fiscal ability of the State to spread losses across many citizens, and
intertemporally. Risk securitization represents the second alternative. It relies on the
huge pool of financial capacity provided by the asset market. Risk securitization is
accomplished by issuing specific conditional claims and selling them directly to
financial investors. Options on natural catastrophes (cat spreads) have started tradingat the Chicago Board of Trade in 1995, and catastrophe-linked bonds (cat bonds) have
been issued since 1997.
A third solution, which may be combined with risk securitization, is risk
mutualization. Economic theory teaches that losses that cannot be diversified away in
a portfolio of risks or an insurance-reinsurance pool should be shared by economic
agents according to their respective risk-tolerance. This is the mutuality principle due
to Karl Borch (1962). Mutualization may occur through the financial market using
risk securitization. It may also occur within the insurance market by having the
insureds share in the total result of their insurer. In this case, risk mutualization in the
economy is a combination of three processes: first, among insureds and the insurer in
an insurance company; second, among insurers using reinsurance; and third, among
the wider population of economic agents, using the financial market to diversify the
residual risk.
This paper concentrates on the first process. It argues that, although catastrophes are
defined as an accumulation of claims, catastrophic events are uncorrelated: hurricanes
in Florida are uncorrelated with earthquakes in California or Japan, with tropical
storms in Hawaii, and with floods in Italy or Germany. This is the raison d'être of
catastrophe reinsurance. This observation may be used to improve the financial
capacity within the insurance market by allowing the insureds to participate in the
overall risk. Thus, a Californian insured would be able to increase her utility, if
instead of only purchasing an insurance contract priced according to Californian
earthquake risk, she would be given the opportunity to purchase a contract based on a
portfolio combining Californian earthquake and Floridian hurricane risks.
Our model considers two regions facing independent risks of being struck by a
catastrophe. Each region is populated with a continuum of identical individuals facing
the prospect of losing a random amount of wealth. With severity risk the catastrophic
event may result in an inflation of claim amounts reported to the insurer. Insurance is
proportional, competitive, and available in the form of three kinds of contracts that the
insured may combine: a fixed premium contract, a variable premium contract (with anex post adjustment in the premium depending on the severity of the insured loss
event), and a participating premium contract (with an ex post adjustment in the
premium depending on the overall operating result of the insurer). We find that
optimal insurance results in full coverage of the diversifiable risk and sharing of the
operating risk with the insurer. The demand for the variable premium contract is zero.
With frequency risk, catastrophes do not affect the amount of individual losses, but
they affect the number of losses in the population. Again, the optimal insurance
contract combines a fixed premium contract and a participating contract. However, in
this case, the individual with second order risk aversion (smooth preferences)
purchases partial insurance.
In conclusion, the menu of contracts proposed in Doherty and Schlesinger (1998),
where only one type of catastrophe is considered, is dominated by the menu of
contracts proposed in this paper, taking into account the absence of correlation
between different kinds of catastrophes.Optimal catastrophe insurance
with multiple catastrophes
1. Introduction
This paper adopts a normative approach. It addresses the question of how innovations
in the design of insurance contracts could help resolve the capacity gap in the
provision of insurance against natural catastrophes. It extends previous research with
the same approach (Doherty and Dionne, 1993; Doherty and Schlesinger, 1998;
Schlesinger, 1999) by considering the case of "multiple catastrophes".
Past decades have shown an increasing severity and frequency of losses arising from
natural catastrophes: earthquakes, hurricanes, floods and large-scale fires
1. It is still
controversial whether an increasing frequency of hurricanes and floods may be
attributed to climate change (global warming), but it is clear that concentration of
values in catastrophe-prone coastal areas has brought about an increase in the amount
of losses. From 1970 to 1990, population in the Pacific and South Atlantic coastal
states of the United States increased by 51% and 45% respectively, compared to a
countrywide increase of 24% over the same period. This evolution is a source of
concern for the insurance industry, because the wealth elasticity of insurance demand
is empirically larger than one
2. Thus, rapid increases in exposed wealth mean that
insured losses represent an increasing proportion of total losses
3.
                                                                
1 The insurance industry defines a catastrophe as "an event which causes in excess of $5
million in insured property damage and affects a significant number of insureds and insurers"
(Cummins and Geman, 1995).
2 See Sigma (No 4, 1997): The rich countries of the world are by far the most largely insured.
This may seem in contradiction with the well-known theoretical result that property insurance
is an inferior good (Mossin, 1968). But, as noticed by Chesney and Loubergé (1986), this
result is obtained on the assumption that increases in wealth affect the non-risky portion of
wealth only.
3  For example, one of the most severe catastrophes over the past years was the Kobe
earthquake in 1995,  which caused losses to an amount of  USD 82.4 billion, but insured
losses remained at a more modest 2.5 billion. This is relatively small compared to the series
of losses which were inflicted upon the insurance industry since 1988. Insurers had to pay
USD 12.5 billion for the Northridge earthquake (1994) and 16 billion for Hurricane AndrewCatastrophic losses challenge the economic role of insurance as a private wealth
redistribution mechanism. Insurance makes possible the transfer of  numerous risks. It
is a mechanism whereby insurers collect funds from many agents exposed to similar
risks, to pay for losses that will randomly affect some of these agents. The reinsurance
mechanism complements direct insurance by allowing a world-wide diversification of
risks. In addition, the financial capacity of the insurance industry has been able to
absorb deviations of total losses from their expected value. However, financial
capacity has been outpaced by potential losses in the catastrophe lines. The total
capital of the US property-casualty insurance industry is estimated at USD 200
billion, of which 20 billion provided by reinsurers (Kielholz and Durrer, 1997). The
coverage capacity in the catastrophe line of business (direct insurance and
reinsurance) is estimated at USD 25 billion. This is less than the reference losses
estimated by reinsurers at 50 billion for California earthquakes and 45 billion for East
Coast storms, and this is well below the maximum losses expected from these two
kinds of events: 100 billion for California earthquakes and 85 billion for East Coast
storms.
The problem arises because the risk of natural catastrophes is not widely diversifiable
in an insurance context where insurers supply coverage in well-defined business lines.
Natural catastrophes tend to occur in selected areas of the globe: seismic regions and
ocean coasts. Moreover, only a subset of these regions expresses much demand for
insurance coverage
4. Thus, reinsurers are not able to disseminate the risk easily across
the world, and cross-subsidization among different lines of business is not feasible in
a competitive environment.
                                                                                                                                                                                         
(1992), more than 40 percent of the combined total cost for these two events, estimated at
USD 65 billion. Hurricane Hugo (1989) cost them 5 billion, Hurricane Opal (1995) 2.1 billion,
and Hurricane Fran (1996) 1.6 billion. Insured losses in excess of 1 billion became the rule
rather than the exception since the end of the eighties: see exhibit 8 in Canter et al. (1996).
4 Figures published in Sigma (No 4, 1997) show that North America, Western Europe and
Japan make up 90 percent of the global non-life insurance premium income.Two types of  solutions to the insurance capacity gap have been proposed and put into
practice. Mandatory public provision of insurance is a first alternative. It relies on the
financial and fiscal ability of the State to spread losses across many citizens, and
intertemporally. This was imposed in a country like France, where all insureds pay an
additional premium on their property-liability insurance contracts to get coverage
against natural catastrophes, with a reinsurance guarantee provided by the State
5. Risk
securitization represents the second alternative. It relies on the huge pool of financial
capacity provided by asset markets. For example, total capitalization of the US
financial market amounts to approximately USD 20 trillion, with a daily standard
deviation of around USD 130 billion. Thus, typical daily fluctuations in total US asset
market capitalization are able to cover the maximum probable loss from a California
earthquake. Risk securitization is accomplished by issuing specific conditional claims
and selling them directly to financial investors. Options on natural catastrophes (cat
spreads) have started trading at the Chicago Board of Trade in 1995, and catastrophe-
linked bonds (cat bonds) have been issued since 1997
6.
A third solution, which may be combined with risk securitization, is risk
mutualization. Economic theory teaches that losses that cannot be diversified away in
a portfolio of risks or an insurance-reinsurance pool should be shared by economic
agents according to their respective risk-tolerance. This is the mutuality principle due
to Karl Borch (1962). Large-scale mutualization already occurs through the financial
market, via widely held insurance stocks and via risk securitization. But a first layer
of mutualization may also be organised within the insurance market by having the
insureds share in the operational result of their insurers. As argued by Doherty and
Dionne (1993), such an arrangement is particularly appropriate when the risk is
partially undiversifiable: decomposition of the risk into idiosyncratic and
nonindiosyncratic risk with separate allocations of the components leads to some
                                                                
5 See Magnan (1995). See also Lewis and Murdock (1996) for a proposal of more
government intervention in the coverage of US natural catastrophes.
6 The developments in catastrophe risk securitization were analyzed in Doherty (1997) and
Jaffee and Russell (1997). Catastrophe options were priced and analyzed by Cummins and
Geman (1995). Catastrophe-linked bonds were priced and analyzed by Loubergé et al.
(1999).degree of mutualization (see also Schlesinger, 1999). Under this scenario, risk
mutualization occurs as a combination of three processes, instead of two: first, among
insureds in an insurance company; second, among insurers using reinsurance; and
third, among the wider population of economic agents, using the financial market to
diversify the residual risk.
This paper concentrates on the first process. It extends the models proposed by
Doherty and Schlesinger (1998) by noting that, although catastrophes are defined as
an accumulation of claims, catastrophic events are largely uncorrelated: hurricanes in
Florida are uncorrelated with earthquakes in California or Japan, with tropical storms
in Hawaii, and with floods in Italy or Germany. This is the raison d'être of
catastrophe reinsurance. This observation may be used to improve the financial
capacity within the insurance market by allowing the insureds to participate in the
overall risk of their insurer. Thus, a Californian insured would be able to increase her
utility, if instead of only purchasing an insurance contract priced according to
Californian earthquake risk, she would be given the opportunity to purchase a contract
based on the portfolio of her insurer’s Californian earthquake and Floridian hurricane
risks.
Our model is presented in the next two sections and the optimal insurance contract is
derived in section 4. The model is initially based on the assumption that natural
catastrophes affect the severity of losses, but not their frequency in the insured
population. Frequency risk is then introduced in section 5. A more complete model,
combining frequency and severity risk is developed in section 6. The last section
concludes.
2. The model
Consider two geographic regions (or two groups of insureds), A and B,  facing
independent risks of being struck by a catastrophe, e.g., a hurricane in Florida and anearthquake in California. Let ( , , ) W F m  be a probability space and let
L R R j : : W W ﬁ ﬁ + and e  for j = (A,B) be well-defined random variables.
Each region is populated with a continuum of individuals. We assume that these
individuals are identical in both regions: same initial wealth W > 0,  same preferences
and attitudes towards risk
7. In the absence of catastrophe, each individual faces the
prospect of losing a random amount L, with expected value EL. Losses L are i.i.d., and
insurable at zero transaction cost. However, in each region, the catastrophic event may
result in an "inflation" of claims, brought about by the simultaneity of losses (severity
risk). In region j (j = A,B), the random loss faced by individual i becomes  ) 1 ( j ij L e + ,
where e is random and is region-specific (i.e., the same for all individuals in the
region). Without loss of generality, we assume E j ( ) e = 0. Moreover, we assume that
the random catastrophic component e is independent of L for all individuals, and that
the catastrophes occurring in regions A and B are independent of one another:
E L E ij j A B ( ) ( ) e e e = = 0 , for all i and j. To avoid complications of personal
bankruptcy, we assume that the distribution for the random variable L(1+ej) has a
support which is bounded between zero and W. Finally, to avoid negative loss
amounts, we assume ej > -1.  Thus, for example, if  15 . = A e , all losses in region A are
15 percent higher.
Competitive insurers provide damage insurance in the two regions. Insurance is
proportional, with coverage  [ ] 1 , 0 ˛ a  chosen by the insured. Three types of contracts
are available, and the insured is free to combine the three types, with the same a:
1. Fixed premium contract. In this contract, the insurer retains the catastrophic
component of the risk by charging the insured a fixed premium based on the expected
                                                                
7 The individuals are not necessarily expected utility maximizers.  Individuals are risk averse,
by which we mean they are averse to mean-preserving spreads of the wealth distribution.  We
will assume that they display either first-order or second-order risk aversion, in the sense of
Segal and Spivak (1990).value of losses. This risk is then either assumed, or reinsured, or hedged, or
securitized (or a combination of these actions is chosen) against the payment of a risk
premium l, the same for each type of catastrophe. Thus, although the catastrophe risk
is statistically uncorrelated with market risk, we assume that a risk premium is
required to compensate shareholders and/or financial investors, due to imperfections
in the market, such as agency costs or asymmetric taxes
8. This risk premium is passed
through to the policyholders as a loading. The fixed premium in region j is thus:
P E L EL j
f
j j j = + + = + a l e a l ( ) ( ) ( ) . 1 1 1
2. Variable premium contract. In this contract, the insurer does not assume the
catastrophic risk of its policyholders. The insured pays an initial premium equal to the
expected value of losses. An ex post adjustment in the premium then occurs to take
into account the actual severity of losses within her group (A or B), so that the
premium is initially random. Assuming zero interest rates, the variable premium in
region j is thus: P EL j
v
j j = + a e ( ) . 1
3. Participating premium contract. With this contract, the insurer acts as a mutual
insurer. The insured shares in the more or less favorable loss experience of her
insurer. She pays initially the expected value of her losses. An ex post adjustment in
the premium occurs eventually, depending on the overall result of the insurer. Again,
the premium is initially random and is defined as P m EL j
p
j = + a ( ) , 1  where m is a
random element which is a weighted average of  A e and  B e  as defined below.
The variable and participating premiums allow the insured to share in the catastrophe
risk, either locally, or more widely. In principle, such a sharing could also occur using
the financial market by having the insured purchase shares of the insurer's equity
9
although equity prices are more comprehensive and more forward-looking. It also
                                                                
8 See Garven & Loubergé (1996) or Eeckhoudt, Gollier & Schlesinger (1997). A risk premium
may also be justified in the presence of parameter uncertainty (see Hogarth & Kunreuther,
1992).
9 This is called "homemade mutualization" by Doherty and Dionne (1993).could occur using derivatives markets for one’s own personal account, for instance by
writing CBOT cat call spreads on the Florida index, or the California index, or both.
The insured would then pay a fixed insurance premium, with a loading l, and would
get back part of this loading by writing options. Alternatively, the catastrophic risk
could be excluded from coverage, and the individual would have to get the desired
coverage against this risk by hedging on the derivatives market. However, this would
involve retention of the idiosyncratic part of the risk by the individual.  The individual
has essentially a random level of the e -risk and thus cannot easily hedge the overall
risk level of  ) 1 ( e + L .  By offering a menu of contracts, the insurer acts as a financial
intermediary, taking advantage of lower (or zero) information and transaction costs, as
well as “pooling” the levels of e -risk.
The combined insurance premium is P, defined as  ,
2 1 0 p v f P P P P b b b + + =  with
3 2 1 0 S ) , , ( ˛ b b b , the unit simplex on 
3 ￿ .  The insured has the choice of a and of
every b 
i .
3. Definition of m.
The factor m affecting the participating premium is endogenous. It depends on the
share of the catastrophe risk remaining with the insurer once all insureds have decided
how to combine the three kinds of contracts.
Consider the situation in region A.
- A fraction 
0
A Ab a  of risk e A is assumed by the insurer and does not trigger any
recovery or allowance. It is compensated by the risk premium l.
- A fraction 
1
A Ab a  of risk e A is assumed by the insureds in region A. This fraction
leads to a recovery of  EL A A A e b a
1 .- Assuming the same number n of individuals in both regions, a fraction
[ ) (
2 2 2
B B A A A A b a b a b a + ] of the remaining (e A + eB ) risk is assumed by the insureds
in region A. This fraction leads to a recovery of  mEL A A
2 b a .
The remaining (e A + eB ) risk is  ) 1 ( ) 1 (
1 0 1 0




1 0 1 0 ) 1 ( ) 1 (
B B A A
B B B A A A
B B A A
B B B B A A A A m
b a b a
e b a e b a
b a b a





- - + - -
=
As it turns out, m represents the unit of overall risk remaining to be shared. It may
also be shown that this value of m leads to a fair amount of technical loss/profit for the
insurer, given the values of b0 in each region. Assuming the same number of
policyholders in both regions, the total loss/gain after recoveries or allowances is
{ }. ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 2 1 1
B B A A B B B A A A m nEL b a b a b e a b e a + - - + -  Plugging the above value of
m in this expression yields the fair loss/gain incurred by the insurer:
{ }.
0 0
B B B A A A nEL b e a b e a +
4. Optimal insurance
4.1. Optimal coinsurance
Using the canonical model of optimal insurance purchasing under a proportional
contract, the final wealth of the representative individual in region A is written as:
(1) Y W P L A A A A = - - - + ( )( ) 1 1 a e
with:
{ }
{ }. ) ( ) ( 1
) 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 0
2 1 0
A A A A A A
A A A A A A
m EL
EL m EL EL P
e b e l b e a
b e b l b a
- + - + + =
+ + + + + =
Rearranging yields:
(2) { } { } ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 0
A A A A A A A A A m EL EL W L EL W Y e g e l g e a a e - + - + - - - - + =
where g a b g a b A A A A A A
0 0 2 2 = =  and  . Using these definitions, we may rewrite m as 
m m
A A B B
A B




g e g e
g g
g g e e
2 2
2 2
2 2 ( , , , ).Noting that g can be made independent of a by an appropriate choice of b, the second
term in brackets in equation (2) may be treated as an independent background risk
with respect to  W EL L A A - - - a a ( ) 1 . For this latter term, the optimal a is one for
any realized value of (1+eA) and for any risk averse decision-maker: see Schlesinger
(1997)(1999).
4.2. Optimal contracting
Assuming symmetry of regions A and B,  1
* * = = A B a a , where an asterisk denotes an
optimal value. Moreover, assuming rational expectations among the identical
individuals yields  .   and  
* 2 * 2 * 0 * 0
B A B A b b b b = =  The final wealth of the representative
individual in region A may thus be rewritten as:
(3)
{ } { }
{ } m EL EL W
m EL EL W EL W Y
A A A A
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b e b l b
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. Given that E(z) = 0, E(e) = 0, and E(e¦z) = 0, z + te is a mean-preserving
spread of z as defined by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1970). Thus z dominates z + te by
second-order stochastic dominance, i.e. for every risk averter in our enlarged
definition. As a result, t* = 0, which is the same as b A
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2
) 1 ( ) (
0 0 B A
A A A EL EL W Y
e e
b l b .Given that the random term  ( ) / e e A B + 2  can take values lower than the fixed term l
,  1
* 0 < A b  for every risk averter.
To sum up, the individual insures fully (a* = 1) to get rid of the diversifiable risk. She
then optimally shares the global catastrophe risk with the insurer, to avoid paying the
full risk premium l. In contrast with what might be expected a priori, it is suboptimal
for her to be pooled only with risks of the same class. This result is in accordance with
Borch's (1962) mutuality principle.5.  The case of frequency risk
In this case, the occurrence of a catastrophe is assumed to have no impact on the
severity of individual losses. To simplify the severity component of the model, we
assume for now all-or-nothing losses: either L = 0 with probability 1-p, or L = M < W
with probability p. The latter probability is an ex ante measure based on long-term
statistical records of claims, including claims due to catastrophes. We assume that p is
the same in both regions, A and B.
However, catastrophes are rare events, so that the current period frequency of losses
among a population of insured individuals in region j is random. For j = (A,B), let
f p j j = + ( ) 1 d  represent the random frequency, with d j R :Wﬁ  and with
E E E A B A B ( ) ( ) ( ) d d d d = = = 0. The support of d is [-1, (1-p)/p].  We can think of
) 1 ( j p d + , for a realized value of  j d , as the ex post probability of a randomly chosen
insured having a loss during the given period.  In other words,  ) 1 ( j p d + represents the
actual relative loss frequency for the current period whereas p represents the long-run
average loss frequency per period.
If total losses are the same, the insurer is indifferent as to whether catastrophes
provoke a general increase in the severity of losses, for a given frequency, or whether
they yield an increase in the frequency of losses for a given severity. If EL = pM, and
the random components e and d are the same, the total claims from region j are the
same, using either model:  { } { } pM n EL n j j ) 1 ( ) 1 ( d e + = + .
Using the same contract design as in section 2, we define:
P pM j
f
j = + a l ( ) 1 (fixed premium contract)
P pM j
v
j j = + a d ( ) 1 (variable premium contract)
P m pM j
p
j = + a ( ) 1 , with m
A A A B B B




a b d a b d
a b a b
2 2
2 2 . (participating contract)The final wealth of the representative individual from A is thus:
(6) { } { } m pM L pM W Y A A A A A A A A
2 1 0 ) 1 ( b d b l b a a a + + - - - - = .
This may be rewritten as:
(6') { } { } ) ( ) ( ) 1 ( ) 1 (
2 1 l g l d g a l a - + - - - - + - = m pM L pM W Y A A A A A A , using
the same definition of g as in the preceding section.
Again, the second term in the preceding equation may be treated as an independent
background risk. However, because the first term now incorporates the loading, the
optimal insurance coverage is less than one if the individual has second order risk
aversion
10. It may be one if she has first order risk aversion.
Using again the symmetry of A and B, and assuming rational expectations, we get
a a d d A B A B m








￿ + - + - - - - = ) (
2
1
) 1 ( ) 1 (
0 0 te z pM L pM W Y A A A A A A b l b a a a
As in the preceding section, risk aversion leads to 
* 0 * 2 * 0 * 1 1   and   , 1 < 0   , 0 * A A A A t b b b b - = < = = .
The representative individual insures partially, and chooses to share in the global
catastrophe risk, to save on the loading, as previously. To get an intuition of why
insurance is partial in this model, note that the  A a  factor in the second term of (6)
cannot be “undone” by appropriate choices of 
i
A b , since the 
i
A b  must sum to one.
Thus, increasing the insurance level will always increase the level of this undesirable
second term, and hence an optimal insurance level is less than one.
                                                                
10 Assuming standard risk aversion, Eeckhoudt and Kimball (1992) have shown that the
optimal insurance coverage under a loaded premium and an independent background risk is
less than it would be under no background risk. (However, they consider an actuarially fair
background risk, whereas the background risk defined by (6') has a positive expected value).6. Simultaneous frequency risk and severity risk
In this section, we combine the basic models presented in sections 2 and 5 above.
Catastrophes affect both the frequency of losses in the population and the severity of
these losses. As before, the random frequency of losses is given by  f p j j = + ( ) 1 d ,
with  p f E j = ) ( , and j = (A,B). For simplicity, we assume the severity of a loss would
be the constant M, adjusted only by the perfectly correlated catastrophe factor  j e .  If a
loss occurs in region j, its magnitude is thus  ) 1 ( j M e + .   Dropping subscript j, the ex
ante random loss is now defined as:
(7) ) 1 ( ) ( e d h + = M L ,
with  ) (d h a Bernoulli variable taking values 1 or 0 with (random) probabilities
) 1 ( d + p  and  ) 1 ( 1 d + - p .  As before, we assume that the e  as well as the d are
identical within each region, with  0 ) ( ) ( = = d e E E .
Taking into account the fact that the random variables e and d may be positively
correlated, we find  [ ] ) , ( 1 ) ( e d Cov pM L E + = .Then, using the same contracts design
as previously, we define
11:
[ ]pM Cov L E P j j j j j
f
j ) , ( 1 ) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 ( e d l a l a + + = + =  (fixed premium contract)
pM P j j j
v
j ) 1 )( 1 ( e d a + + = (variable premium contract)
pM m P j
p
j ) 1 ( + =a (participating contract)
with  2 2
2 2 ) ( ) (
B B A A
B B B B B B A A A A A A m
b a b a
e d e d b a e d e d b a
+
+ + + + +
= .
Using these premiums and dropping the subscript for ease of exposition, we derive the
final wealth for an individual:
) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 (
2 1 2 1 m pM pM L E L W Y + - + + - + - - - - - = a b e d a b a l b b a
                                                                
11 Note that the premium loading l will not be the same as previously.  In particular, a
positive correlation between e  and d  is likely to lead to a higher market premium for the
catastrophic risk.This expression may be rearranged to yield:
(8)
{ }
[ ] [ ] { } ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 ( ) 1 )( 1 (
) 1 ( ) ( ) 1 (
2 1 C m C pM
L L E W Y
+ + - + + + + - + + -
- - + - =
l g l e d g
a l
where  ab g =  as before and  ) , ( e d Cov C = .
Again, the second term in this expression may be treated as an independent
background risk. Looking at the first term in brackets, we obtain that the optimal
insurance coverage is less than one if the individual has second order risk aversion,
and that it is less than or equal to one if she has first order risk aversion. Without
surprise, this is the same as under frequency risk.
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= t  as before. However, in this case we have:
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with the symmetry assumption being used in obtaining E(e) = 0. Given that E(e¦z) = 0,
z + te is a mean-preserving spread of z. Thus, the optimal t is again zero for every risk
averter.
These results do not differ qualitatively from what we obtain in the frequency risk
model:
* 0 * 2 * 0 * 1 1   and    , 1 < 0   , 0 * , 1 * A A A A t b b b b a - = < = = £ .However, any comparative-static analysis will yield ambiguous results without
specifying parameters of the model for a particular case.
7. Conclusion
This paper extends the previous literature on catastrophe insurance by considering the
case where insureds are able to take advantage of other catastrophe risk handled by
their own insurer. As in Doherty and Schlesinger (1998), insureds are offered a menu
of contracts and they are able to mix these contracts. With two classes of catastrophes,
three basic contract types are proposed: a fixed premium contract providing partial or
full coverage, a variable premium contract offering the opportunity to the insured to
share in the local catastrophe risk (as she would do, for example, when investing on
her own account in cat options on a local index), and a participating premium contract
offering the opportunity to participate in the insurer's portfolio of catastrophe-linked
risks.
We find that the optimal mix for a risk-averse insured combines the fixed premium
contract and the participating premium contract. It is not optimal for the individual to
include a contract share in the local catastrophe risk. Thus, the menu of contract
proposed in Doherty and Schlesinger (1998) and Schlesinger (1999), where only one
type of catastrophe is considered, is dominated by the menu of contracts proposed in
this paper, taking into account the absence of correlation between different
catastrophes. In addition, the result is shown to be robust to a generalization of the
model, to take into account the simultaneous occurrence of severity and frequency
risk.
In accordance with Borch's (1962) mutuality principle, our results imply that
endogenizing the participation levels of insureds would be a welfare-improving
innovation in the property-liability insurance market.  They provide a further
instrument for efficient risk sharing between insurers and insureds.  The results further
imply that larger insurers, who more likely can write policies covering several
catastrophic exposures, might have an additional advantage in the global marketplace.References
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